

**Alaska Judicial Council
Performance Evaluation for:**

**Judge Andrew Guidi
Anchorage Superior Court**

The Alaska Judicial Council finds Judge Guidi met or exceeded performance standards, and recommends a **“YES”** vote for another term in office

Judge Guidi was appointed to the Superior Court in July of 2010. This is his second retention evaluation. Judge Guidi handles a mostly civil caseload with a small number of criminal cases.

Performance Summary:

After conducting its performance review, the Judicial Council determined that Judge Guidi met or exceeded performance standards on all criteria, including legal ability, integrity, impartiality/fairness, temperament, diligence, and administrative skills.

The Council also determined that Judge Guidi met or exceeded educational requirements set by the Alaska Supreme Court.

Because Judge Guidi met or exceeded all performance and professional development standards, the Alaska Judicial Council recommends a “yes” vote on retention in office.

Performance Findings:

The Council conducts a thorough performance review of each judge standing for retention. Key findings for Judge Guidi include:

- **Ratings by justice system professionals:** Attorneys and social services professionals who appeared before Judge Guidi gave him very good reviews, as did court employees.
- **Ratings by jurors:** Jurors who served in trials before Judge Guidi during 2018 and 2019 rated him 5.0 overall on a five-point scale. One juror commented, “Judge Guidi was impressive and compassionate to all parties.”
- **Professional activities:** The Council’s review of Judge Guidi’s professional activities showed positive contributions to his community and to the administration of justice. Judge Guidi served on the Anchorage Child in Need of Aid Therapeutic Court, a court for families involved in the child welfare system as a result of substance abuse. He served on the court system’s Child in Need of Aid Court Improvement Committee (a group that works to improve the court system’s handling of cases involving the child welfare system), and the court system’s Civil Rules Committee. He has spoken to Scout meetings upon invitation.

- **Other performance indicators:** The Council's review of other performance indicators, including Judge Guidi's financial and conflict of interest statements, disqualifications from cases, and appellate reversal rates, raised no performance concerns.
- **Timeliness:** Alaska law requires judges' pay be withheld if a decision is pending longer than six months. The Council verified that Judge Guidi was paid on schedule, and he certified that he had no untimely decisions.
- **Ethics:** There were no public disciplinary proceedings against Judge Guidi, and the Council's review found no ethical concerns.

Documents:

- [Judge Guidi's Judge Questionnaire](#)
- [Judge Guidi's Attorney Survey Ratings](#)
- [Judge Guidi's Court Employee Survey Ratings](#)
- [Judge Guidi's Social Services Professionals Survey Ratings](#)
- [Juror Survey Memo](#)
- [Peremptory Challenges Memo](#)
- [Recusal Records Memo](#)
- [Appellate Evaluation Memo](#)


[Print Questionnaire](#)

alaska judicial council

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Alaska Judicial Council Trial Judge Questionnaire

2020 Candidates for Judicial Retention

November 2019

Andrew Guidi

Name

Alaska Superior Court

Court

1. Please estimate your workload during your present term.

a) <u>90</u> % civil cases	b) <u>4</u> # of jury trials/year
<u>5</u> % criminal cases	<u>35</u> # of non-jury trials/year
<u>5</u> % court administrative work	<u>4</u> # of administrative appeals/year
100 % Total	

2. Please describe your participation on court/bar committees or other administrative activities during your current term of office.

(1) I preside over the CINA Therapeutic Court (CTC), which sits every Tuesday afternoon for parents whose children are in the custody of OCS as a result of the parents' drug addiction. This work is in addition to my regular CINA caseload. CTC has administrative meetings approximately every 2 months and annual policy meetings. I also host team development meetings approx. twice yearly at my home.

(2) I sit on the CINA improvement committee (part of the CINA improvement project), which meets twice per year

(3) I am a member of the Civil Rules Committee, which meets twice yearly.

(4) I am a member of the E-filing committee, but it has not met in a number of years.

3. Please describe any judicial or legal education you have undertaken or provided during your current term in office.

*I attended an NJC course, "Judicial Philosophy" in Austin, TX two years ago. This seminar-style course, probably the most interesting I have ever taken, focused on different approaches to statutory and constitutional interpretation and required significant preparation, including written opinions on hypothetical cases.

*I attended an NADCP (National Ass'n of Drug Court Professionals) annual meeting in Houston, TX in 2018.

*I attended a day-long training session on new CINA regulations earlier in 2019.

*Annual training sessions as part of the Court System's judicial conferences.

4. Please describe any public outreach activities.

*Upon invitation, I have spoken to scout meetings.

Juror welcomes at the courthouse.

*Post-trial jury discussions about what we can do to make the process better; likes and dislikes.

5. Please assess, in one or two paragraphs, your judicial performance during your present term. Appropriate areas of comment could include: satisfaction with your judicial role, specific contributions to the judiciary or the field of law, increases in legal knowledge and judicial skills, or other measures of judicial abilities that you believe to be important.

(1) Contributions to the judiciary of the field of law: In *Donahue v. Legends* I synthesized, out of a number of disparate precedents, a test for determining the enforceability of pre-recreational activity liability waivers. The Alaska Supreme Court adopted verbatim the multi-factor test I developed.

(2) I am currently attempting to improve the presentation and efficiency of the property aspects of divorce trials by requiring a mandatory discovery device, which I call "mandatory reciprocal one-hour depositions." The theory behind the idea is that formal discovery is under-utilized by the divorce bar, partly owing to habit and partly to the economics of that particular practice. By allowing a one-hour depo of each party, back-to-back, without prejudice to a redeposition at a later date, the parties have a fairly inexpensive, and efficient means of obtaining information about their case and, more importantly, they actually hear the other side's view of the case before they show up for trial.

(3) Self-rating: I would rate myself brilliant on some days; so-so on others. Overall, reasonably good. Since September 2010 I believe my handling of jury trials has improved and become fairly streamlined (as much as that can be said about a process that is, by design, not supposed to be particularly efficient). My office operates fairly efficiently in terms of processing cases and rendering decisions in a timely manner. My largest frustration with the position is the lack of adequate time for deep reflection and deliberation. There are some decisions that really should be mulled over for a few weeks but that, all too often, must be decided in a matter of days or even hours. It appears that time is a luxury only the appellate judges can afford.

6. During your most recent term as a judge, have you:
- a) had a tax lien filed or other collection procedure instituted against you by federal, state, or local authorities? ☐ Yes ☒ No
 - b) been involved in a non-judicial capacity in any legal proceeding whether as a party or otherwise? ☒ Yes ☐ No
 - c) engaged in the practice of law (other than as a judge)? ☐ Yes ☒ No
 - d) held office in any political party? ☐ Yes ☒ No
 - e) held any other local, state or federal office? ☐ Yes ☒ No
 - f) had any complaints, charges or grievances filed against you with the Alaska Commission on Judicial Conduct, the Alaska Bar Association, the Alaska Court System, or any other agency that resulted in public proceedings or sanctions?
☐ Yes ☒ No
7. If your answer to any of the questions above is "yes," please give full details, including dates, facts, case numbers and outcomes.

With regard to 6.b., I was named on a witness list by one of my neighbors, Mike Ferris, in a civil action that arose when one of his dogs bit a passer-by. I didn't see the incident. I believe Mr. Ferris expected me to comment on his exercise of reasonable care in handling his dogs. I believe the trial was to occur a month or two ago. I assume the case has settled. I was not deposed.

8. Please provide any other information which you believe would assist the Council in conducting its evaluations and in preparing its recommendations for the 2020 retention elections.

Being a superior court judge is extremely challenging, humbling and rewarding. Challenging because you have to deal with an almost infinite variety of fact patterns, legal topics and personalities. Humbling because the moment you allow yourself to believe you have the job "solved" the case or parties throw you a curve and, to continue the baseball analogy, you feel like a rookie again. My job is rewarding because there's real satisfaction in finding one's way through a disorganized morass of facts to a just solution. In short, I'm up for another term.

For questions 9 - 12, please do not list any cases that have pending issues in your court.

9. Please list your three most recent jury trials including case names and numbers. Please list the names, current addresses, including zip codes and suite numbers where applicable, of each attorney involved in these trials. (Attach additional pages if necessary.)

Case Number 1

Case Name: Weidner Investments LLC

Case Number: 3AN-15-08984 CI

v. Tammie Guilford

Attorneys Involved:

Name: Stacy Walker

Name: Mark Spooner

Address: 329 F St. #200

Address: 329 F St. #200

City, State, Zip: Anchorage, AK 99501

City, State, Zip: Anchorage, AK 99501

Name: Nicholas Kittleson

Name:

Address: 9058 Dewberry St.

Address:

City, State, Zip: Anchorage, AK 99502

City, State, Zip:

Case Number 2

Case Name: Anton Hopfinger

Case Number: 3AN-17-04285 CI

v. Alice Rosoff, Alaska Dispatch Publishing

Attorneys Involved:

Name: Jeffrey Robinson

Name: David Gross

Address: 1227 W. 9th Ave., #200

Address: 510 L St., Ste. 700

City, State, Zip: Anchorage, AK 99501

City, State, Zip: Anchorage, AK 99501

Name:

Name:

Address:

Address:

City, State, Zip:

City, State, Zip:

Case Number 3

Case Name: State of Alaska

Case Number: 3AN-19-07678 CR

v. Terry Allen Turner

Attorneys Involved:

Name: Charles Agerter

Name: Daniel Lowery

Address: 310 K St., Ste 520

Address: 900 W. 5th Ave., #200

City, State, Zip: Anchorage, AK 99501

City, State, Zip: Anchorage, AK 99501

Name:

Name:

Address:

Address:

City, State, Zip:

City, State, Zip:

10. Please list your three most recent non-jury trials including case names and numbers. Please list the names, current addresses, including zip codes and suite numbers where applicable, of each attorney involved in these trials. (Attach additional pages if necessary.)

Case Number 1

Case Name: Troy Adams **Case Number:** 3AN-15-04843 CI
v. Kimberly Adams

Attorneys Involved:

Name: Ian Wheelles	Name: Jerald Reichlin
Address: 601 E. 57th PI #101	Address: 1600 A Street #101
City, State, Zip: Anchorage, AK 99518	City, State, Zip: Anchorage, AK 99501
Name: _____	Name: _____
Address: _____	Address: _____
City, State, Zip: _____	City, State, Zip: _____

Case Number 2

Case Name: Kyle Gadd **Case Number:** 3AN-19-05619 CI
v. Michelle Gadd

Attorneys Involved:

Name: Matt Chiklo	Name: Ryan Roley
Address: 807 G St. #100	Address: 8409 Mentra St.
City, State, Zip: Anchorage, AK 99501	City, State, Zip: Anchorage, AK 99508
Name: _____	Name: _____
Address: _____	Address: _____
City, State, Zip: _____	City, State, Zip: _____

Case Number 3

Case Name: Michael Keenan, Delores Keenan **Case Number:** 3AN-12-08714 CI
v. Jackson Meyer, Kandice Meyer

Attorneys Involved:

Name: Donna Willard	Name: Debra Fitzgerald
Address: 1120 Huffman Rd., Ste. 24, No. 231	Address: 500 L St., #300
City, State, Zip: Anchorage, AK 99515	City, State, Zip: Anchorage, AK 99501
Name: Robert Corbisier	Name: _____
Address: 500 L St., #300	Address: _____
City, State, Zip: Anchorage, AK 99501	City, State, Zip: _____

11. Please list your three most recent cases, including case names and numbers, which did not go to trial, but on which you did significant work (such as settlement conference, hearings, motion work, etc.). Please list the names, current addresses, including zip codes and suite numbers where applicable, of each attorney involved in these cases. (Attach additional pages if necessary.)

Case Number 1

Case Name: Ahtna, Inc. **Case Number:** 3AN-08-06337 CI
 v. State of Alaska, Dept. of Transportation

Attorneys Involved:

Name: Matthew Singer	Name: Jessica Alloway
Address: 420 L St., Ste. 400	Address: 1031 W. 4th Ave., #200
City, State, Zip: Anchorage, AK 99501	City, State, Zip: Anchorage, AK 99501
Name: _____	Name: _____
Address: _____	Address: _____
City, State, Zip: _____	City, State, Zip: _____

Case Number 2

Case Name: Leah Stevens and Danielle Rehm **Case Number:** 3AN-16-09915 CI
 v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co.

Attorneys Involved:

Name: Peter Sandberg	Name: Daniel Quinn
Address: 813 W. 3rd Ave.	Address: 360 K St. #200
City, State, Zip: Anchorage, AK 99501	City, State, Zip: Anchorage, AK 99501
Name: Cheryl Graves	Name: _____
Address: 807 G. St., Ste. 250	Address: _____
City, State, Zip: Anchorage, AK 99501	City, State, Zip: _____

Case Number 3

Case Name: Mark London, MD **Case Number:** 3AN-13-07550 CI
 v. State of Alaska, Alaska State Medical Board

Attorneys Involved:

Name: John Tiemessen	Name: Kathryn Vogel
Address: 411 4th Ave., #300	Address: 1031 W. 4th Ave. #200
City, State, Zip: Fairbanks, AK 99701	City, State, Zip: Anchorage, AK 99501
Name: Joan Wilson	Name: _____
Address: 1031 W. 4th Ave., #200	Address: _____
City, State, Zip: Anchorage, AK 99501	City, State, Zip: _____

12. *Optional:* If you deem it helpful to the Council, please list up to three other cases during your past term in which you believe your work was particularly noteworthy. Please list the names, current addresses, including zip codes and suite numbers where applicable, of each attorney involved in these cases. (Attach additional pages if necessary.)

Case Number 1

Case Name: University of Alaska, Federation of Teachers, Local 2404 **Case Number:** 3AN-14-04472 CI
v. Alaska Labor Relations Agency, United Academics

Attorneys Involved:

Name: Kathleen Barnard	Name: Kimberly Rodgers
Address: 18 West Mercer St. #200	Address: 1031 W. 4th Ave., #200
City, State, Zip: Seattle, WA 98119	City, State, Zip: Anchorage, AK 99501
Name: Kim Dunn	Name:
Address: 701 W. 8th Ave., #1200	Address:
City, State, Zip: Anchorage, AK 99501	City, State, Zip:

Case Number 2

Case Name: **Case Number:**
v.

Attorneys Involved:

Name:	Name:
Address:	Address:
City, State, Zip:	City, State, Zip:
Name:	Name:
Address:	Address:
City, State, Zip:	City, State, Zip:

Case Number 3

Case Name: **Case Number:**
v.

Attorneys Involved:

Name:	Name:
Address:	Address:
City, State, Zip:	City, State, Zip:
Name:	Name:
Address:	Address:
City, State, Zip:	City, State, Zip:

(This question pertains to Superior Court judges only.)

State law requires the Council to conduct an evaluation of judges standing for retention, and to provide information to the public about the judges. Under a provision added in 2013, the information the Council provides to the public "shall include the judge's consideration of victims when imposing sentence on persons convicted of felony offenses where the offenses involve victims." (see AS 22.10.150). Although the Council's evaluations address all aspects of judicial performance, including felony sentencing, they have not in the past explicitly solicited judges' thoughts on this topic.

Please submit a short statement about how you consider victims when imposing sentences in felony offenses.

See attached letter.



Superior Court
State of Alaska
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

ANDREW GUIDI
Superior Court Judge

825 W. FOURTH AVENUE
ANCHORAGE, ALASKA 99501-2004

(907) 264-0826
FAX (907) 264-0720

February 28, 2020

Susanne DiPietro
Alaska Judicial Council
510 L Street, Suite 450
Anchorage, AK 99501

Ms. DiPietro:

The Council has asked how I consider victims when imposing sentences in felony offenses. To the best of my recollection, I have had only one felony sentencing to date. In that case the victim of a burglary received notice of the sentencing and attended the hearing. The victim was given an opportunity to be heard and invited to comment on the adequacy of the sentence recommended by the State and the sentence suggested by the defendant. This provided me an opportunity to take the victim's comments into account in formulating the defendant's sentence.

I believe it's very important that victims be given adequate notice of sentencing hearings and provided a fair opportunity to be heard. This is essential not only to inform the judge's decision but also to provide the victim a sense of restorative justice, that is, a sense of healing that only comes from a belief that the community cares about the harm suffered by the victim.

Sincerely,

Andrew Guidi
Superior Court Judge

Table 21
Judge Andrew Guidi
Demographic Description of Respondents - Bar Association Members

	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
All respondents	275	100
Experience with Judge		
Direct professional experience	250	90.9
Professional reputation	21	7.6
Other personal contacts	4	1.5
Detailed Experience*		
Recent experience (within last 5 years)	214	89.2
Substantial amount of experience	77	30.9
Moderate amount of experience	92	36.9
Limited amount of experience	80	32.1
Type of Practice		
No response	3	1.1
Private, solo	68	24.7
Private, 2-5 attorneys	46	16.7
Private, 6+ attorneys	39	14.2
Private, corporate employee	8	2.9
Judge or judicial officer	31	11.3
Government	55	20.0
Public service agency or organization	6	2.2
Retired	17	6.2
Other	2	0.7
Length of Alaska Practice		
No response	2	0.7
5 years or fewer	22	8.0
6 to 10 years	27	9.8
11 to 15 years	20	7.3
16 to 20 years	29	10.5
More than 20 years	175	63.6
Cases Handled		
No response	3	1.1
Prosecution	5	1.8
Criminal	9	3.3
Mixed criminal & civil	63	22.9
Civil	183	66.5
Other	12	4.4
Location of Practice		
No response	3	1.1
First District	5	1.8
Second District	1	0.4
Third District	252	91.6
Fourth District	11	4.0
Outside Alaska	3	1.1
Gender		
No response	5	1.8
Male	174	63.3
Female	96	34.9

*Only among those respondents reporting direct professional experience with the judge.

Table 22
Judge Andrew Guidi
Detailed Responses - Bar Association Members

		Legal Ability	Impartiality/ Fairness	Integrity	Judicial Temperament	Diligence	Overall
	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>M</i>
All respondents	275	4.2	4.1	4.4	4.2	4.3	4.1
Basis for Evaluation							
Direct professional experience	250	4.3	4.1	4.4	4.2	4.3	4.2
Experience within last 5 years	214	4.3	4.2	4.4	4.2	4.3	4.2
Experience not within last 5 years	26	4.3	4.0	4.3	4.2	4.2	4.2
Substantial amount of experience	77	4.4	4.1	4.4	4.2	4.3	4.2
Moderate amount of experience	92	4.1	4.1	4.3	4.2	4.2	4.1
Limited amount of experience	80	4.3	4.3	4.5	4.3	4.3	4.2
Professional reputation	21	4.0	4.0	4.3	4.0	4.4	4.0
Other personal contacts	4	4.3	3.8	4.0	3.8	3.8	3.8
Type of Practice*							
Private, solo	64	4.2	4.2	4.4	4.3	4.1	4.2
Private, 2-5 attorneys	43	4.3	4.2	4.5	4.3	4.4	4.2
Private, 6+ attorneys	36	4.4	4.3	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.3
Private, corporate employee	6	4.5	4.5	4.7	4.4	4.3	4.7
Judge or judicial officer	26	4.6	4.2	4.4	4.2	4.4	4.2
Government	51	4.1	4.0	4.3	4.1	4.2	4.0
Public service agency or organization	6	3.8	3.3	3.7	3.2	3.8	3.3
Retired	13	4.6	4.4	4.7	4.6	4.5	4.4
Other	2	3.5	3.5	3.5	4.0	3.5	3.5
Length of Alaska Practice*							
5 years or fewer	19	3.9	3.9	4.3	3.9	4.1	3.9
6 to 10 years	26	4.0	3.9	4.1	3.9	3.9	3.9
11 to 15 years	20	4.4	4.4	4.6	4.5	4.4	4.4
16 to 20 years	25	4.4	4.1	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.2
More than 20 years	158	4.3	4.2	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.2
Cases Handled*							
Prosecution	5	4.6	4.4	4.8	4.4	4.4	4.6
Criminal	6	3.8	3.3	3.3	3.5	4.3	3.5
Mixed criminal & civil	56	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.3
Civil	170	4.2	4.1	4.4	4.2	4.3	4.2
Other	10	4.6	4.6	4.9	4.6	4.6	4.5
Location of Practice*							
First District	4	3.3	3.5	3.8	4.0	3.5	3.5
Second District	1	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
Third District	231	4.3	4.2	4.4	4.2	4.3	4.2
Fourth District	9	3.8	3.8	4.1	3.9	4.0	3.8
Outside Alaska	2	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.0	4.5	4.5
Gender*							
Male	155	4.3	4.2	4.4	4.2	4.3	4.2
Female	90	4.2	4.1	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.2

*Ratings from only those respondents reporting direct professional experience with the judge.

Table 15
Judge Andrew Guidi
Description of Respondents' Experience - Court Employees

	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
All respondents	31	100
Experience with Judge		
Direct professional experience	27	87.1
Professional reputation	3	9.7
Other personal contacts	1	3.2
Detailed Experience*		
Recent experience (within last 5 years)	27	100
Substantial amount of experience	5	18.5
Moderate amount of experience	10	37.0
Limited amount of experience	12	44.4

*Only among those respondents reporting direct professional experience with the judge.

Table 16
Judge Andrew Guidi
Detailed Responses - Court Employees

	<i>n</i>	Impartiality/ Fairness <i>M</i>	Integrity <i>M</i>	Judicial Temperament <i>M</i>	Diligence <i>M</i>	Overall <i>M</i>
All respondents	31	4.6	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.6
Basis for Evaluation						
Direct professional experience	27	4.6	4.7	4.4	4.5	4.6
Experience within last 5 years	27	4.6	4.7	4.4	4.5	4.6
Experience not within last 5 years	-	-	-	-	-	-
Substantial amount of experience	5	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
Moderate amount of experience	10	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.5	4.6
Limited amount of experience	12	4.3	4.5	4.0	4.3	4.4
Professional reputation	3	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7
Other personal contacts	1	-	-	-	-	-

Table 8
Judge Andrew Guidi
Demographic Description of Respondents' Experience - Social Service Professionals

	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
All respondents	23	100
Experience with Judge		
Direct professional experience	21	91.3
Professional reputation	1	4.3
Other personal contacts	1	4.3
Detailed Experience*		
Recent experience (within last 5 years)	20	95.2
Substantial amount of experience	8	38.1
Moderate amount of experience	5	23.8
Limited amount of experience	8	38.1

*Only among those respondents reporting direct professional experience with the judge.

Table 9
Judge Andrew Guidi
Detailed Responses - Social Service Professionals

		Impartiality/ Fairness	Integrity	Judicial Temperament	Diligence	Overall
	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>M</i>
All respondents	23	4.5	4.6	4.4	4.5	4.5
Basis for Evaluation						
Direct professional experience	21	4.6	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.5
Experience within last 5 years	20	4.6	4.7	4.6	4.6	4.6
Experience not within last 5 years	1	4.0	3.0	2.0	4.0	3.0
Substantial amount of experience	8	4.5	4.8	4.6	4.6	4.5
Moderate amount of experience	5	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4
Limited amount of experience	8	4.8	4.6	4.4	4.5	4.6
Professional reputation	1	4.0	4.0	3.0	4.0	4.0
Other personal contacts	1	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0



alaska judicial council

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E-mail: postmaster@ajc.state.ak.us

MEMORANDUM

TO: Judicial Council
FROM: Staff
DATE: March 17, 2020
RE: Juror Survey Report

The Alaska Judicial Council surveyed all jurors who sat in trials during 2018 and 2019. The jurors sat before all of the 20 trial court judges eligible to stand for retention in 2020. A total of 754 jurors responded on Council-provided postcards that judges distributed to jurors at the end of each trial (see attached Juror Survey Card Example). Jurors completed the surveys on the postage-paid cards and mailed them to the Council.

Council staff entered the data from the surveys and ran basic descriptive statistics. This memorandum summarizes the findings. It is distributed to Council members and judges, and posted on the Council's website.

Table 1 shows the distribution of jurors by type of trial reported for each judge. Some jurors only wrote comments and did not rate the judge on the specific variables. Thus, there may be more respondents shown on Table 1 than appear on the judges' individual tables.

Table 1: Distribution of Jurors by Type of Trial, by Judge Alaska Judicial Council 2020 Retention Juror Survey				
Judge	Civil	Criminal	No Answer	Total
Christian, Matthew	0	34	0	34
Crosby, Dani	19	0	1	20
DiBenedetto, Romano D.	0	26	2	28
Dickson, Leslie N.	3	72	5	80
Franciosi, Michael	1	46	1	48
Guidi, Andrew	25	29	7	61
Hanley, J. Patrick	4	38	5	47
Henderson, Jennifer	29	3	0	32
Lamoureux, Yvonne	15	12	0	27
Logue, Michael	0	30	1	31
McCrea, Kari	0	28	3	31
Miller, Gregory	1	0	0	1
Montgomery, Will	3	64	14	81
Peters, Nathaniel	1	21	12	34
Reigh, Christina	0	43	3	46
Roetman, Paul A.	4	5	0	9
Wallace, David	1	35	2	38
Washington, Pamela S.	1	37	3	41
Wells, Jennifer	0	39	9	48
Woodman, Jonathan	0	16	1	17

Table 2 shows the distribution of number of days served, as reported by the jurors. Seventy-three percent of the jurors served fewer than five days.

Table 2: Distribution of Days Served Alaska Judicial Council 2020 Retention Juror Survey		
Number of Days Served	%	N
1 - 2 Days	20	152
3 - 4 Days	53	397
5 - 7 Days	15	114
8 - 10 Days	6	46
11 - 20 Days	2	11
21 or More Days	0	1
No Answer	4	33
Total		754

Individual Results

Table 3 shows each judge's mean rating for each question on the survey. Each judge's individual survey results are provided in separate tables. Jurors used a five-point scale, with ***excellent rated as five, and poor rated as one***. The closer the jurors' ratings were to five, the higher that judge's evaluation by the jurors. The last column shows the total number of jurors who evaluated the judge on at least one variable.

Table 3:
Mean Rating for each Variable and for "Overall Performance," by Judge
 Alaska Judicial Council
 2020 Retention Juror Survey

	Impartiality and Fairness	Respectful and Courteous	Attentive During Proceedings	Control During Proceedings	Intelligence and Skill as a Judge	Overall Mean	Total Count
Christian, Matthew	4.9	4.8	4.9	4.8	4.9	4.9	34
Crosby, Dani	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	20
DiBenedetto, Romano D.	4.8	4.8	4.7	4.8	4.7	4.8	28
Dickson, Leslie N.	4.8	4.9	4.8	4.7	4.7	4.8	80
Franciosi, Michael	4.9	5.0	4.9	4.9	4.9	5.0	48
Guidi, Andrew	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	61
Hanley, J. Patrick	4.9	5.0	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	47
Henderson, Jennifer	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	32
Lamoureux, Yvonne	4.8	5.0	5.0	4.9	4.9	5.0	27
Logue, Michael	4.8	4.9	4.9	4.8	4.9	4.9	31
McCrea, Kari	4.8	4.9	4.9	4.7	4.8	4.8	31
Miller, Gregory	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	1
Montgomery, Will	4.6	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.7	4.6	81
Peters, Nathaniel	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.5	4.5	34
Reigh, Christina	4.7	4.8	4.7	4.7	4.8	4.7	46
Roetman, Paul A.	4.8	4.8	4.9	4.9	4.8	4.8	9
Wallace, David	4.8	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	38
Washington, Pamela S.	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.9	4.9	4.9	41
Wells, Jennifer	4.9	5.0	4.9	4.8	5.0	4.9	48
Woodman, Jonathan	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	17

Juror Survey Results 2020 Retention Evaluation Guidi, Andrew							
Survey Category	Mean	Poor (1)	Deficient (2)	Acceptable (3)	Good (4)	Excellent (5)	Total Responses
Impartiality / Fairness	5.0	0	0	0	2	59	61
Respectful / Courteous	5.0	0	0	0	2	59	61
Attentive During Proceedings	5.0	0	0	0	3	58	61
Control Over Proceedings	5.0	0	0	0	3	58	61
Intelligence / Skill as a Judge	5.0	0	0	1	0	60	61
Overall Evaluation	5.0	0	0	1	0	60	61



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MEMORANDUM

TO: Judicial Council
FROM: Staff
DATE: July 15, 2020
RE: Peremptory Challenges of Judges Eligible for Retention in 2020

I. Introduction

In Alaska, a defendant has a right to a fair trial before an unbiased judge and the right to preempt a judge without proving bias or interest.¹ Two different authorities govern the challenge right. The legislature created the substantive right and defines its scope by statute.² The court regulates peremptory challenge procedures by court rules.³ In general, each side in a case gets one peremptory challenge.⁴

This memo examines peremptory challenge records for judges who are eligible to stand for retention in November 2020. The tables display civil and criminal case challenges for each judge, by year. Because superior court judges' terms are six years, a six-year period is examined for them. Because district court judges' terms are four years, a four-year period is examined for them. Parties have no right to challenge an appellate judge, so those judges are not discussed.

¹See *Gieffels v. State*, 552 P.2d 661 (Alaska 1976).

²See *id.*; AS 22.20.020.

³See Alaska R. Crim. P. 25(d); Alaska R. Civ. P. 42(c).

⁴See *id.*

II. Context for evaluating peremptory challenge data

Although the peremptory challenge provisions were designed to ensure each litigant's right to a hearing by a fair and impartial judge, in practice many factors prompt litigants or attorneys to challenge judges. Some parties might challenge a judge because they perceive the judge to be unfair in a certain type of case, while others might challenge a judge because they perceive the judge to be "too fair," and hope their case will be reassigned to a judge who they perceive as being more favorable to their case. Such a scenario can be especially relevant in smaller judicial districts and communities, where attorneys often can predict which other judge will receive the reassigned case. Other reasons parties might challenge judges include unfamiliarity with a new judge or seeking to avoid the demands of a judge who insists on high standards of practice or timeliness. Sometimes an attorney will use a peremptory challenge with the hope that a change of judge will result in additional time to prepare the case.

The Alaska Court System provides the Council with data regarding "disqualifications." The data are categorized into disqualifications brought in criminal cases by defense attorneys or prosecutors, those brought in civil cases by plaintiffs or defendants, and those initiated by the judges themselves. Judge-initiated disqualifications are discussed in a separate memorandum. Children's delinquency cases are included among criminal cases in this analysis because that is how they are accounted for in the court's case management system. Child in Need of Aid cases are included in the civil category.

Please note that in Child in Need of Aid cases, guardians ad litem and parents have the right to preempt the judge. These are noted as "other" on the following charts. Please also note that a CINA "case" that a judge may handle may include several consolidated cases because each child in a family is assigned a different case number. So if a judge receives a peremptory challenge in a consolidated CINA case, challenges are recorded for each individual child's case, magnifying the effect of challenges in CINA cases.

One system was used for compiling the disqualification data. Over the past fourteen years, the court has instituted a computerized case management system (CourtView) that has facilitated the collection and reporting of more detailed and accurate data for all court locations in the state. All of the CourtView data were compiled and reported by the Alaska Court System to the Alaska Judicial Council.

Care must be taken when comparing judges because they have different caseloads. Judges with higher-volume caseloads generally will have more peremptory challenges than those with lower-volume caseloads. Presiding judges sometimes ease one court's heavy caseload by assigning cases to judges from other venues within their judicial district, and to *pro tem* judges. Moreover, superior courts with heavy caseloads may ease their burden somewhat by assigning the bulk of a case to masters and/or magistrates. Similarly, district court judges may have very different caseloads. Cases may be handled by magistrates as well as by district court judges. The court system's caseload data do not reflect when a judge regularly travels to another community

to hear cases. Finally, consideration must be taken of judges who handle predominately criminal or predominately civil caseloads, as superior court judges in Anchorage do, versus those judges who handle all cases.

Parties who have not previously exercised their right of peremptory challenge may challenge a judge when one is newly assigned midstream, as if their case had been newly filed. Consequently, challenges often increase when a judge is assigned to a different caseload (e.g., from civil to criminal). Challenges also often occur when a new judge is appointed because those judges are newly assigned to existing cases and because that judge is “unknown” and thus less predictable. Another factor to consider is that some communities have only one or two assistant district attorneys or assistant public defenders. If an assistant DA or PD perceives a reason to categorically challenge a particular judge, that judge’s criminal peremptory challenge rate will be high, even though just one or two attorneys might be responsible for virtually all of that judge’s challenges. This may also occur in high-volume civil cases that involve only a few public attorneys, such as in Child in Need of Aid practice.

Care must also be taken when comparing judges across judicial districts. In 1995, the Anchorage Superior Court consolidated into civil and criminal divisions. Since then, all civil cases (including domestic relations, Child in Need of Aid, and domestic violence protective order cases) have been assigned equally to each of the Anchorage Superior Court judges in the civil division. Criminal division judges handle criminal and child delinquency cases, but do not routinely handle domestic cases. For this reason, it may be misleading to compare the peremptory challenges of a superior court judge in Anchorage with the rate of a superior court judge in another judicial district. Also, some judges in some judicial districts currently handle the therapeutic courts, such as Wellness Court. The impact of those caseloads on a judge’s challenge rate is unknown.

Because so many factors may potentially affect the number of peremptory challenges filed, these numbers should only be used as a signal of a potential issue with a judge. Once a high number of challenges is identified from the table, please refer to the explanatory text on the following pages which gives context for the judge’s caseload and potential factors which may have affected his or her challenge rates.

Blank spaces in the tables represent years that preceded the judge’s appointment to his or her current position. “Other” signifies a parent, or guardian ad litem in a Child in Need of Aid case.

III. Peremptory Challenge Records - Superior Court Judges

Peremptory Challenges of Judges - Superior Court																	
Judicial District	Judge	Party	2014		2015		2016		2017		2018		2019		Summary		
			Civil	Criminal	Civil	Criminal	Civil	Criminal	Civil	Criminal	Civil	Criminal	Civil	Criminal	Total	Mean*	Median*
Second	DiBenedetto, Romano D	Defendant	0	1	1	1	0	2	21	7	5
		Plaintiff	1	0	0	0	1	0			
		Other	12	0	0	0	2	0			
	Roetman, Paul A	Defendant	0	1	1	3	0	9	0	5	0	0	0	0	32	5.3	5
		Plaintiff	0	0	3	0	2	1	1	0	1	1	3	0			
		Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0			
	Summary														53	5.9	5
Third	Crosby, Dani R	Defendant	.	.	0	0	5	0	3	0	1	0	3	0	28	5.6	6
		Plaintiff	.	.	3	0	4	0	5	0	0	0	3	0			
		Other	.	.	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
	Guidi, Andrew	Defendant	6	0	2	0	2	0	6	1	9	0	31	1	157	26.2	21
		Plaintiff	7	0	11	0	14	0	23	0	16	0	22	0			
		Other	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0			
	Henderson, Jennifer S	Defendant	2	0	3	0	0	0	28	9.3	10
		Plaintiff	8	0	3	0	4	0			
		Other	0	0	8	0	0	0			
	Lamoureux, Yvonne	Defendant	7	0	2	0	1	0	21	7	9
		Plaintiff	2	0	1	0	2	0			
		Other	0	0	6	0	0	0			
	Miller, Gregory A	Defendant	7	0	3	0	8	1	4	1	11	0	13	0	106	17.7	18
		Plaintiff	4	0	0	0	10	1	9	0	10	0	7	7			
		Other	3	0	3	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0			
	Reigh, Christina L	Defendant	1	1	0	1	2	0	9	3	2
		Plaintiff	1	0	0	0	0	0			
		Other	3	0	0	0	0	0			
	Wells, Jennifer K	Defendant	8	1	3	0	5	3	38	12.7	11
		Plaintiff	2	0	3	1	2	0			
		Other	6	0	4	0	0	0			
	Woodman, Jonathan A	Defendant	1	0	1	1	2	3	6	6	37	9.2	8
		Plaintiff	0	0	1	0	3	0	8	0			
		Other	0	0	2	0	3	0	0	0			
	Summary														424	12.8	10
Fourth	Peters, Nathaniel	Defendant	0	22	1	5	3	6	37	12.3	9
		Plaintiff	0	0	0	0	0	0			
		Other	0	0	0	0	0	0			
All	Summary														514	11.4	9

. = No value

Defendant = defendant in both criminal and civil cases

* Mean and median unit of analysis is judge/year

Plaintiff = plaintiff in civil cases and prosecutor in criminal cases

Other = Judge Disqualified for Cause; Peremptory Disqualification by Father/Mother/GAL/State

Overall: The average number of peremptory challenges for the superior court judges on the ballot for 2020 was 11.4 per year. The number of peremptory challenges averaged over the last five election cycles was 27.8 (2010-2018). Since 2006, average numbers of peremptory

challenges for judges eligible for retention have ranged from a low of 11.4 (2020) to a high of 36 (2006 and 2008). The peremptory challenge average was 14.4 in 2018.

First Judicial District: No judges are eligible for retention in the First Judicial District in 2020.

Second Judicial District: None of the superior court judges in the Second Judicial District received unusually high numbers of peremptory challenges. Judge DiBenedetto and Judge Roetman received low averages of 7 and 5.3, respectively.

Third Judicial District: None of the superior court judges in the Third Judicial District received unusually high numbers of peremptory challenges. Although the number of challenges Judge Guidi received was higher than that received by other judges in this particular group, the number was not unusual when compared to judges' averages over the last ten years.

Fourth Judicial District: None of the superior court judges in the Fourth Judicial District received unusually high numbers of peremptory challenges.

IV. Peremptory Challenge Records - District Court Judges

Peremptory Challenges of Judges - District Court													
Judicial District	Judge	Party	2016		2017		2018		2019		Summary		
			Civil	Criminal	Civil	Criminal	Civil	Criminal	Civil	Criminal	Total	Mean*	Median*
Third	Dickson, Leslie N	Defendant	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	2.2	1.5
		Plaintiff	1	0	3	3	1	1	0	0			
	Franciosi, Michael J	Defendant	.	.	0	0	0	1	1	0	6	2	2
		Plaintiff	.	.	0	0	1	2	0	1			
	Hanley, J Patrick	Defendant	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	1.8	1
		Plaintiff	0	5	0	1	0	1	0	0			
	Logue, Michael B	Defendant	0	0	0	0	9	4.5	4.5
		Plaintiff	0	2	1	6			
	McCrea, Kari L	Defendant	.	.	0	0	1	0	0	0	18	6	7
		Plaintiff	.	.	0	0	0	10	0	7			
	Wallace, David R	Defendant	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	1	1
		Plaintiff	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0			
	Washington, Pamela S	Defendant	0	2	6	6	6
		Plaintiff	3	1			
	Summary										59	2.8	2
Fourth	Christian, Matthew C	Defendant	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	19	4.8	3
		Plaintiff	0	12	0	5	0	0	0	0			
	Montgomery, William T	Defendant	0	4	0	3	7	3.5	3.5
		Plaintiff	0	0	0	0			
	Summary										26	4.3	3.5
All	Summary										85	3.1	2

. = No value

Defendant = defendant in both criminal and civil cases

* Mean and median unit of analysis is judge/year

Plaintiff = plaintiff in civil cases and prosecutor in criminal cases

Overall: The mean number of peremptory challenges for a district court judge appearing on the ballot in 2020 was 3.1. This mean was much lower than in 2018 when the average was skewed upward largely due to one judge's numbers to 34.9.

First Judicial District: No district court judges in the First Judicial District are eligible for retention in 2020.

Second Judicial District: The Second Judicial District has no district court judges.

Third Judicial District: District court judges in the Third Judicial District received an average of 2.8 peremptory challenges per year. Judge Washington has no data from 2016 to 2018 because she served temporarily on the Anchorage Superior Court during that time. She received only six challenges during the year she served on the Anchorage District Court, the court to which she was appointed.

Fourth Judicial District: The two district court judges from the Fourth Judicial District eligible for retention received very few challenges. Judge Christian received an average of 4.8 challenges per year and Judge Montgomery received an average of 3.5 challenges per year.



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MEMORANDUM

TO: Judicial Council
FROM: Staff
DATE: July 15, 2020
RE: Recusal Records of Judges Eligible for Retention in 2020

I. Introduction

One tool that the Judicial Council uses for evaluating judges is a judge's record of self-disqualification from cases, or "recusals." Judges are required to disclose potential reasons for disqualification and then step down from cases when there is a conflict. If a judge's activities prevent him or her from sitting on an inordinate number of cases, however, that judge may not be as effective as other judges in handling his or her caseload. This memo examines recusal records of those judges who are eligible for retention in 2020.

II. Context for interpreting recusal data

Alaska Statute 22.20.020 sets forth the matters in which a judge may not participate. Judges may not act in matters: when the judge is a party; when the judge is related to a party or an attorney; when the judge is a material witness; when the judge or a member of the judge's family has a direct financial interest; when one of the parties has recently been represented by the judge or the judge's former law firm; or when the judge for any reason feels that a fair and impartial decision cannot be given. Judicial officers must disclose any reason for possible disqualification at the beginning of a matter.

Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3E presents even broader bases for recusal. The canon states that a judge is disqualified whenever the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The rule also requires a judge to disclose on the record any information that the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the question of disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no real basis for disqualification. The canon provides examples, including instances when the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or an attorney, the judge has personal knowledge of the disputed facts, the judge or the judge's former law partner served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or when the judge knows that he or she, or the judge's spouse, parent, or child has an economic or other interest in the matter, or is likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.

Canon 4 requires judges to conduct their extra-judicial activities so as to comply with the requirements of the Code and so that the activities do not cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge, demean the judicial office, or interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties. Canon 4 restricts a judge's activities so as to minimize the instances that would require disqualification.

Conflicts and resulting disqualifications are unavoidable. Judges must recuse themselves when conflicts arise. Recusals do not necessarily indicate that a judge has failed to sufficiently regulate his or her extra-judicial activities. Only very high disqualification rates should trigger an inquiry about whether a judge is comporting him or herself so as to perform his or her judicial duties effectively.

The following tables list the number of instances each judge recused him or herself in the preceding six (for superior court judges) and four (for district court judges) years. Blank cells indicate that the judge had not yet been appointed to his or her current position.

III. Recusal Records - Superior Court Judges

Judge Recusals - Superior Court																
Judicial District	Judge	2014		2015		2016		2017		2018		2019		Summary		
		Civil	Criminal	Civil	Criminal	Civil	Criminal	Civil	Criminal	Civil	Criminal	Civil	Criminal	Total	Mean*	Median*
Second	DiBenedetto, Romano D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Roetman, Paul A	2	0	1	1	7	1	12	0	5	0	11	0	40	6.7	6.5
	Summary													40	4.4	2
Third	Crosby, Dani R	.	.	1	0	18	0	26	0	11	0	8	0	64	12.8	11
	Guidi, Andrew	6	0	3	0	11	0	6	0	6	0	3	0	35	5.8	6
	Henderson, Jennifer S	6	0	4	0	8	0	18	6	6
	Lamoureux, Yvonne	1	0	1	0	2	0	4	1.3	1
	Miller, Gregory A	6	0	8	0	6	0	5	3	3	0	2	0	33	5.5	6
	Reigh, Christina L	1	1	1	0	0	2	5	1.7	2
	Wells, Jennifer K	5	0	3	0	5	0	13	4.3	5
	Woodman, Jonathan A	3	1	1	1	5	0	6	3	20	5	4.5
	Summary													192	5.8	5
Fourth	Peters, Nathaniel	0	0	2	2	0	2	6	2	2
All	Summary													238	5.3	4

. = No value

* Mean and median unit of analysis is judge/year

The recusal rates for superior court judges eligible for retention election in 2020 are unremarkable. The judge with the highest number of recusals (though still low) was Judge Crosby, who averaged 12.8 recusals per year. Most of these came in her first two years on the bench, with declining numbers afterwards. Judge Crosby had previously been in private practice in Anchorage, and her numbers likely reflect her previous activity as a practicing lawyer.

IV. Recusal Records - District Court Judges

Judge Recusals - District Court												
Judicial District	Judge	2016		2017		2018		2019		Summary		
		Civil	Criminal	Civil	Criminal	Civil	Criminal	Civil	Criminal	Total	Mean*	Median*
Third	Dickson, Leslie N	4	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	10	2.5	2
	Franciosi, Michael J	.	.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Hanley, J Patrick	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.5	0.5
	Logue, Michael B	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	McCrea, Kari L	.	.	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.3	0
	Wallace, David R	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.2	0
	Washington, Pamela S	3	0	5	0	3	0	0	0	11	2.8	3
	Summary									25	1	0
Fourth	Christian, Matthew C	3	0	1	4	1	0	4	0	13	3.2	3.5
	Montgomery, William T	1	25	0	9	35	17.5	17.5
	Summary									48	8	4.5
All	Summary									73	2.4	1

. = No value

* Mean and median unit of analysis is judge/year

District court judges typically recuse themselves infrequently. The recusal data for all district court judges standing for retention in 2020 was unremarkable.



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MEMORANDUM

TO: Judicial Council
FROM: Staff
DATE: August 7, 2020
RE: Appellate Evaluation of Judges Eligible for Retention in 2020

I. Introduction

The Judicial Council staff has several ways of evaluating judges' performance. One way is to compare how each judge's decisions withstand appellate review.

The review process begins with a staff member, usually the staff attorney, reading every published appellate decision and every memorandum opinion and judgment released by the appellate courts. Staff first determines how many issues were on appeal and then decides whether the appellate court "affirmed" each of the trial judge's decisions on appeal. Decisions requiring reversal, remand or vacating of the trial court judge's ruling or judgment are not classified as "affirmed." Mooted issues and issues arising only upon appeal, which were not ruled on by the trial judge, are not taken into account. When the Alaska Supreme Court or Alaska Court of Appeals *clearly* overrules a prior statement of law upon which the trial court reasonably relied to decide an issue, that issue is not considered. These cases are very rare.

After deciding how many issues in a case were affirmed, the case is given a score. For instance, if two of ten issues are affirmed, the case is given a score of “20% affirmed.” This scoring system is different than the court system’s methodology, which notes only whether the case was affirmed, partly affirmed, reversed, remanded, vacated, or dismissed. Also, the court system tends to attribute the appeal to the last judge of record rather than determine which judge’s decisions were appealed. In this analysis, if a case includes more than one judge’s decisions, an attempt is made to determine which judge made which rulings and to assign affirmance scores appropriate with those decisions. If it is not possible to make that determination from the text of the case, the overall affirmance score for that case is assigned to each judge of record.

After the case has been scored, another staff member enters information about the case into a database. The data fields include case type,¹ judge, affirmance score, date of publication or release, opinion number, and trial case number.

Before a retention election, staff cross-checks the cases in its database to make sure the database is as complete as possible. Staff then analyzes each retention judge’s “civil,” “criminal,”² and overall (combined) affirmance rates. Staff also calculates civil, criminal, and overall affirmance rates for all the judges in the database for the retention period. Staff then compares affirmance rates for that year against affirmance rates for prior years. Cases that are included in the calculation of these rates are only those cases that have been decided in the current retention term, which is a six-year span for superior court judges and a four-year span for district court judges.

Several problems are inherent in this process. First, the division of an opinion into separate “issues” is sometimes highly subjective. Some opinions have only one or two clearly defined issues and are easy to categorize. Other opinions present many main issues and even more sub-issues. Deciding whether a topic should be treated as a “sub-issue” or an “issue” deserving separate analysis can be problematic and varies depending on the complexity of a given case. Generally, the analysis follows the court’s outlining of the case; if the court has given a sub-issue its own heading, the sub-issue will likely have its own affirmed/not affirmed decision.

Second, each issue is weighted equally, regardless of its effect on the case outcome, its legal importance, or the applicable standard of review. For instance, a critical constitutional law

¹ Cases are classified as general civil, tort, child in need of aid (“CINA”), family law/domestic relations, administrative appeal, criminal, and juvenile delinquency. If a case has issues relating to more than one category, staff decides which category predominates.

² “Criminal” includes criminal, post-conviction relief, and juvenile delinquency cases. All other cases are classified as “civil.” Because the supreme court reviews administrative appeals independently of the superior court’s rulings, administrative appeals are not analyzed as part of the judge’s civil affirmance rate, although they are included in the database.

issue is weighted equally with a legally less important issue of whether a trial judge properly awarded attorney's fees. Issues that the appellate court reviews independently of the trial court's decision (*de novo* review) are weighted equally with issues that are reviewed under standards of review that defer to the trial court's discretion. The Judicial Council staff has considered ways to weigh each issue to reflect its significance but has decided not to implement a weighted analysis.

Third, appellate courts tend to affirm some types of cases more often than others. For example, criminal cases are affirmed at a higher rate than civil cases. Many criminal appeals involve excessive sentence claims that are reviewed under a "clearly mistaken" standard of review that is very deferential to the trial court's action. Criminal appeals are more likely to include issues that have less merit than issues raised in civil appeals because, unlike most civil appeals, most criminal appeals are brought at public expense. The cost of raising an issue on appeal is therefore more of a factor in determining whether an issue is raised in a civil appeal than it is in a criminal appeal. Also, court-appointed counsel in a criminal appeal must abide by a defendant's constitutional right to appeal his or her conviction and sentence unless counsel files a brief in the appellate court explaining reasons why the appeal would be frivolous. This circumstance can result in the pursuit of issues in criminal cases that have a low probability of reversal on appeal. Accordingly, a judge's affirmance rate in criminal cases is almost always higher than that judge's affirmance rate in civil cases. Judges who hear a higher percentage of criminal cases tend to have higher overall affirmance rates than those who hear mostly civil cases. For this reason, staff breaks out each judge's criminal and civil appellate rates.

Fourth, the analysis of appellate affirmance rates does not include any cases appealed from the district court to the superior court. Those decisions are not published or otherwise easily reviewable. Staff has reviewed all published decisions from the Alaska Supreme Court and Alaska Court of Appeals and unpublished Memorandum Opinion and Judgments (MO&Js) from the Alaska Supreme Court and the Alaska Court of Appeals since 2002. These decisions are published on the Alaska Court System's website and elsewhere and are easily reviewable.

Fifth, administrative appeals pose a problem. Administrative decisions are appealed first to the superior court, which acts as an intermediate appellate court.³ Those cases may then be appealed to the supreme court, which gives no deference to the superior court's decision and takes up the case *de novo*. Because the supreme court evaluates only the agency decision, and not the superior court judge's decision, there is little value to these cases as an indicator of a judge's performance and they can be misleading. We have excluded administrative appeals from this analysis for the past several retention cycles.

³ The Alaska Workers Compensation Appeals Commission hears appeals from Alaska Workers' Compensation Board decisions that were decided after November 7, 2005. Those cases may then be appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court. Because workers' compensation appeals are no longer reviewed by the superior court as an intermediate court of appeal, the supreme court decisions are no longer included in this database and are not included in the "administrative appeals" category.

Sixth, the present analysis involves only a relatively small number of cases for some judges. The fewer the number of cases in a sample, the less reliable the analysis is as an indicator of a judge's performance. Affirmance rates for judges having fewer than ten cases reviewed on appeal can be more misleading than helpful. For descriptive purposes, appellate review records are included for all judges, regardless of the number of cases reviewed. Affirmance rates based on fewer than ten cases, however, are not considered by staff as a reliable indicator of performance.

II. Analysis of Appellate Affirmance Rates

A. Superior Court Judges, 2014 - 2019

Generally, the trends of civil, criminal and overall affirmance rates have been stable since the Council began reviewing them in 1994. Criminal affirmance rates have ranged within eight percentage points, from 78% - 85%, over the past twenty-six years and have stayed around 81% - 82% most of that time. Civil affirmance rates mostly ranged within six percentage points, from 67% - 72%, until the 2010 - 2015 retention period, with one period (1996 - 2001) lower, at 61%. Over the past three retention cycles, the civil affirmance rate rose to 76%. Overall, the affirmance rate of all cases was stable at about 75% until the 2006 - 2011 period, when the rate began an upward climb to 78 - 79%, driven first by the rise in criminal affirmance rates, and then by the rise in civil affirmance rates.

Affirmance Rates All Superior Court Judges			
Years	Criminal	Civil	Overall
1994-1999	85%	67%	75%
1996-2001	81%	61%	75%
1998-2003	82%	67%	75%
2000-2005	80%	70%	76%
2002-2007	79%	70%	75%
2004-2009	78%	72%	75%
2006-2011	81%	72%	77%
2008-2013	82%	71%	77%
2010-2015	82%	75%	79%
2012-2017	81%	76%	79%
2014-2019	80%	76%	78%

Affirmance rates for superior court judges who are standing for retention in 2020 are summarized in the following table. The table shows the number of civil cases appealed during the judge's term, the percent of issues in those cases that were affirmed by the appellate court, the number of criminal cases appealed during the judge's term, the percent of issues in those

cases that were affirmed by the appellate court, and the combined civil and criminal appeals information. Comparisons of final column figures should be made carefully. As discussed above, judges with higher percentages of criminal appeals will generally have higher overall affirmance rates than those with a higher percentage of civil appeals. Comparisons between the first two columns are likely to be more meaningful. Also, judges having fewer than ten cases reviewed should not be compared with other judges. The figures for those judges are provided for descriptive purposes only.

To provide even more information for this evaluation, an overall affirmance rate has been calculated for all superior court judges, including judges not standing for retention, and retired or inactive judges, for the evaluation period. This comparison provides a better performance measure than comparing retention judges against each other.

Judicial Affirmance Rates						
Superior Court Judges Eligible for Retention 2020						
	Criminal Affirmance		Civil Affirmance		Overall	
	Number Reviewed	Rate	Number Reviewed	Rate	Number Reviewed	Rate
Second Judicial District						
DiBenedetto, Romano	1	0%	--	--	1	0%
Roetman, Paul A	7	64%	2	100%	9	72%
Third Judicial District						
Crosby, Dani	--	--	7	90%	7	90%
Guidi, Andrew	1	100%	31	77%	32	77%
Henderson, Jennifer	--	--	6	83%	6	83%
Lamoureux, Yvonne	--	--	1	100%	1	100%
Miller, Gregory	25	80%	23	86%	48	83%
Reigh, Christina	--	--	2	62%	2	62%
Wells, Jennifer	1	100%	3	83%	4	88%
Woodman, Jonathan	3	67%	7	62%	10	63%
Fourth Judicial District						
Peters, Nathaniel	1	100%	1	100%	2	100%
Number and mean affirmance rates, superior court judges eligible for retention, 2014 - 2019	39	76%	83	81%	122	79%
Number and mean affirmance rates, all superior court judges 2014 - 2019	990	80%	692	76%	1,682	78%

Note: Data for judges having fewer than ten cases is provided for descriptive purposes only because too few cases are available for meaningful analysis.

Statistically, the smaller the number of cases in a sample, the less reliable the conclusions drawn from that are likely to be. Samples of fewer than ten cases are likely to be misleading. Judges with fewer than ten cases are likely to be new judges without sufficient time for a case to go through all the steps of trial court and appeal court processes.

In the past, we have taken alternative steps to help the reader evaluate appellate court review of decisions by judges with fewer than ten cases. Most of the current cases were affirmed at 100%. To assist the reader, we describe individual cases that were not affirmed at 100%. Alaska Supreme Court cases are designated with simply a date: (2018); Alaska Court of Appeals cases are designated as a date and (Alaska App.).

For this retention cycle, eight of the eleven superior court judges eligible for retention had fewer than ten cases reviewed. With the exception of Judge Roetman, these judges were all newly appointed to the superior court. Some of these judges had previously been either magistrates or district court judges. Appeals concerning their work in those former positions was not considered in this aspect of the evaluation for their current position.

Judge Romano DiBenedetto: Judge DiBenedetto had one criminal case reviewed. It was affirmed at 0% (reversed):

State of Alaska, Department of Public Safety v. Superior Court (Alaska App. 2018) (0%) - In this case, Judge DiBenedetto ordered the Department of Public Safety to transport a defendant from one correctional facility to another for a psychological assessment by the defendant's expert. The Department petitioned for review, arguing that Judge DiBenedetto did not have authority to order the transport. The court of appeals agreed, explaining that while the court had authority to order transport to court proceedings, it did not generally have authority to order transport between two correctional facilities.

Judge Paul Roetman: Judge Roetman had nine appeals reviewed. Six were affirmed at 100%. One was affirmed at 50% and two were affirmed at 0% (reversed):

State of Alaska v. Sheldon (Alaska App. 2018) (0%) - The defendant, a convicted felon, was found in possession of a firearm and arrested. He also admitted to possessing child pornography. He entered a plea agreement to a misconduct involving weapons charge and judgment was entered. Seventeen months later, he was indicted on possession of child pornography charges. He moved to dismiss those charges, arguing that the state violated his right to a speedy trial. Judge Roetman agreed and dismissed the charges. The state appealed. The court of appeals agreed with the state that the two sets of charges did not arise from the same criminal episode and the time to trial on the pornography charges should be considered separately. It reinstated the charges and remanded for further proceedings.

Olanna v. State of Alaska (Alaska App. 2019) (0%) - In this case, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder for strangling and killing his girlfriend. Judge Roetman imposed a sentence of 75 years with no suspended time. The defendant appealed. The court of appeals reviewed Judge Roetman's sentencing remarks and found that he had improperly considered the defendant's eligibility for discretionary parole when imposing sentence. It remanded the case for resentencing.

Russell v. State of Alaska (2019) (50%) - A jury convicted the defendant of manufacturing alcohol in a local option community. The defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence. The court of appeals reviewed the record and concluded the evidence was sufficient to uphold the conviction based in eyewitness testimony of the manufacturing. The defendant also appealed his sentence. The court of appeals did not review his argument because it found the judge and parties made a

different error when they did not consider prior felonies that should have been taken into account when sentencing the defendant. It therefore remanded the case for resentencing.

Judge Dani Crosby: Judge Crosby had seven appeals. Six were affirmed at 100%. One family case was affirmed at 33%:

Gray v. Gray (2019) (33%) - This case involved a custody dispute. The father had successfully moved to modify a previous order allowing him only supervised visitation. The new order allowed increased visitation. He then moved to modify custody to shared physical custody. The mother cross-moved for an order requiring the father to pay unpaid childcare, tutoring, and healthcare expenses. Judge Crosby denied the father's motion for custody and ordered the father to pay the unpaid expenses. The judge also awarded the mother attorney's fees. The father appealed. The supreme court upheld the denial of the motion to modify custody but vacated the order to pay the expenses, remanding so Judge Crosby could interpret how a parenting agreement affected the payment of expenses. The court also vacated and remanded the attorney's fees order.

Judge Jennifer Henderson: Judge Henderson had six appeals considered. Five were affirmed at 100%. One, a family law case, was affirmed at 0% (reversed):

Engeberg. Engeberg (2019) (0%) - A father appealed a child support order, arguing that the judge should have imputed income to the mother because she was underemployed. The court reviewed the record and determined that the judge had not made factual findings on the record about the parties' incomes or the father's request for the judge to impute income. The supreme court therefore remanded the case back to the superior court for further proceedings.

Judge Yvonne Lamoureux: Judge Lamoureux had one case reviewed. It was affirmed at 100%.

Judge Christina Reigh: Judge Reigh had two cases reviewed. One was affirmed at 100%. The other, a family law case, was affirmed at 25%:

Thompson v. Thompson (2019) (25%) - In this case, Judge Reigh issued several orders regarding child custody, marital property division, child support, and attorney's fees. The ex-wife appealed. The supreme court upheld the custody order granting shared physical and legal custody. When it reviewed the child support order, however, it found that Judge Reigh had not made sufficient factual findings on the record that would allow it to review the order so it remanded that issue. The supreme court next reviewed the property division and concluded that Judge Reigh had abused her discretion when she considered the value of a fishing vessel separately and in the husband's favor, rather than together with the rest of the marital estate as marital property. The fishing vessel was acquired during the marriage and was not a gift or separate inheritance. The supreme court therefore reversed that aspect of the property division and remanded that issue. It also vacated the attorney's fees award stemming from the property division order.

Judge Jennifer Wells: Judge Wells had four cases reviewed. Three were affirmed at 100%. One was affirmed at 50%:

In the Matter of the Estate of Alexina Rodman (2019) (50%) - This case concerned an ex-husband's interest in his former spouse's estate. The parties had divorced but had maintained a

relationship and lived together until her death. The supreme court affirmed Judge Wells's ruling that the ex-husband had no property rights in the estate by virtue of their domestic relationship because Alaska Statutes do not provide for domestic partner intestate inheritance. However, the supreme court vacated Judge Wells's orders pertaining to some real property because Judge Wells had never issued final judgments on some of the petitioner's claims that the ex-wife had sold him some of the property.

Judge Nathaniel Peters: Judge Peters had two cases reviewed. Both were affirmed at 100%.

B. District Court Judges, 2016 - 2019

The mean criminal affirmance rate for all district court judges from 2016 - 2019 was 74%, the lowest in the past twenty-two years. District court criminal case affirmance rates have ranged from 74% - 85%. Civil appellate affirmance rates for district court judges are not provided. They are not meaningful because no district court judge regularly has ten or more civil cases appealed to the supreme court.

Criminal Affirmance Rates All District Court Judges	
Years	Mean
1998-2001	81%
2000-2003	77%
2002-2005	77%
2004-2007	85%
2006-2009	84%
2008-2011	81%
2010-2013	79%
2012-2015	84%
2014-2017	79%
2016-2019	74%

District court judges' affirmance rates are summarized in the following table. The table shows the number of criminal cases appealed to the Alaska Court of Appeals and Alaska Supreme Court during the judge's term, and the percent of issues in those cases that were affirmed by the appellate court.

Judicial Affirmance Rates District Court Judges Eligible for Retention 2020		
	Criminal Affirmance	
	Number Reviewed	Rate
Third Judicial District		
Dickson, Leslie N	4	100%
Franciosi, Michael	--	--
Hanley, J Patrick	--	--
Logue, Michael	--	--
McCrea, Kari	--	--
Wallace, David	7	100%
Washington, Pamela S	5	40%
Fourth Judicial District		
Christian, Matthew	1	50%
Montgomery, Will	--	--
Number and mean affirmance rates, district court judges eligible for retention, 2016 - 2019	17	79%
Number and mean affirmance rates, all district court judges, 2016 - 2019	137	74%

Note: Data is provided for descriptive purposes only because too few cases are available for meaningful analysis.

As discussed above, judges having fewer than ten cases reviewed should not be compared with other judges. In the current retention period, no district court judge had more than ten cases. Five of the judges had no cases reviewed: Judge Michael Franciosi, Judge J. Patrick Hanley, Judge Michael Logue, Judge Kari McCrea, and Judge William Montgomery. To provide more context, the judges are discussed individually below.

Judge Leslie Dickson: Judge Dickson had four cases reviewed and was affirmed on all issues in every case.

Judge David Wallace: Judge Wallace had seven cases reviewed and was affirmed on all issues in every case, except for one minor correction to a judgment due to a clerical error.

Judge Pamela Washington: Judge Washington had five criminal cases reviewed. Two cases were affirmed at 100%. Three cases were affirmed at 0% (reversed):

Prince v. State of Alaska, (Alaska App. 2016) (0%) - The defendant was convicted of fourth degree assault. He appealed, arguing that the judge had prevented him from presenting a defense that his conduct involved “mutual combat” and thus qualified for the lesser offense of disorderly conduct. The court of appeals agreed, holding that the judge erred by not allowing testimony that the other person had touched the defendant’s granddaughter in a sexual manner several days before the day of the incident and had taunted the defendant to come over and do something about it.

State of Alaska v. Borowski, (Alaska App. 2016) (0%) - The defendant was convicted of second-degree harassment for posting a message on Assemblyman Dick Traini’s Facebook page that said, “Your going to get assassinated.”[sic] Judge Washington dismissed the charge, ruling that the defendant’s post was protected speech under the First Amendment. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the court

improperly made several findings of fact before it had heard evidence, and that the ruling was based on a mistaken legal premise that the defendant could not be prosecuted unless he seriously intended to harm Mr. Traini. The court of appeals explained that the correct standard was whether the communication would be viewed as a threat.

State of Alaska v. Barber, (Alaska App. 2017) (0%) - The defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance. He later applied for post-conviction relief, contending that the document charging him and the judgment contained the wrong statutory subsection for his crime. Judge Washington granted his application and the state appealed. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the factual basis of the crime (possession of two tablets of suboxone) was uncontested and the discrepancy was a clerical error that could be corrected as long as the defendant had not detrimentally relied on the error when making his plea. The court remanded for further proceedings.

Judge Matthew Christian: Judge Christian had one case reviewed since his appointment as a district court judge. It was affirmed at 50%:

Kinmon v. State of Alaska (Alaska App. 2019) (50%) - The defendant was a licensed game guide in Alaska and was licensed to sell big game tags in the field to nonresident hunters. He was convicted of five counts of tampering with a public record, five counts of committing or aiding the commission of a violation of a big game statute or regulation, and one count of failing to report a violation of a big game law. The defendant appealed. The court of appeals reversed four of the convictions and upheld the remaining seven. The court of appeals held that Judge Christian erred when he did not instruct the jury on a key element of the offense, leaving it for the jury to decide the definition of a legal term. The court then held that Judge Christian did not err when giving a jury instruction on the defendant's "mistake of law" defense. Although the instruction was not ideal, it was an accurate description of Alaska law and the defendant did not object or propose a different instruction.